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ABSTRACT
We consider trade between a flexible wage America and a rigid real wage Europe. In a
benchmark case, a move from autarky to free trade doubles the European unemployment rate,
while it raises the American unskilled wage to the high European level. Entry of the unskilled
“South” to world markets raises unemployment in Europe. But Europe’s commitment to the high
wage completely insulates America from the shock. Immigration to America raises American
income, but lowers European income dollar-for-dollar, while European unemployment rises one-
for-one. We consider a stylized game of the choice of factor market institutions. Mitterand’s
Europe chooses a high minimum wage and Reagan’s America chooses a flexible wage for the
unskilled. Paradoxically, unskilled workers are worse off in Europe. Trade equalizes wages, but
Europeans bear all of the unemployment required to sustain the high wage.
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I. Introduction
In recent years, ftior market developments in the United States and United Kingdom
have contr~ed sharply with those in mntinental Europe, In the US and ~ the relative wage of
the unskilled has declined significantly. In the span of a decade (1979-89) the relative wage of a
US worker in the 90th percentile to that of one in the loth percentile rose by over twenty per
cent. ~reeman and Katz (1995)] This rising wage inequality was much less evident in continental
Europe. However, unemployment has risen sharply in Europe. The early postwar decades are now
thought of as a “Golden Age” for Europe, with unemployment rates of two to three per cent.
Beginning in the 1970s these rates have climbed dramatically, reaching double digits in many of
these countries [CEPR (1995)].
An extensive empirical literature has considered the provenance of these factor market
developments. The studies are of two principal types ~reeman and Katz (1995)]. The individual
country studies provide a rich account of local developments in institutions, factor supplies, and
demand conditions, The comparative (cross-count~) studies abstract from local idiosyncrasies to
search for common themes. However, even the comparative studies suffer from an important
drawback: they remain a collection of individual stones. They do not pretend to provide a
common framework -- and the consistency ttis enforces --to provide a unified acwunt.
This suggests the value of a third approach which maybe termed “global.” It is, in the
first instance, a general equilibrium story. Consistency is enforced by the fact that there is a
simultanmus determination of equilibrium in all of the factor markets. Naturally, tractability limits2
the degree of local institutional detail that maybe ~nsidered. Considering some important
differences in factor market institutions will nonetheless be an important fature of such an
approach,
However, a global approach is more than just general equilibrium. It aims at a unzfied
explanation of very divergent experience. There are two reasons for seeking such a unified
account. First, many of the shocks hitting the industrial “North” are common -- for example, the
ent~ to the integrated world economy of important new trading partners from the newly-
industrialtig “South.”l If we are to believe such accounts, we need to see how these shocks
interact with a variety of local institutions. A more subtle -- but by this more important -- reason
for considering a global approach is that the consequences even of purely local institutions and
shocks ofien depend crucially on the links to the global market.
The mntral institutional detail that motivates the present work is the stylized
characterization of America as a flexible wage economy, and Europe as an economy in which a
variety of institutions -- unions, explicit minimum wages, etc. -- make wages more rigid Freeman
and Katz (1995)]. Thus, we will build a model of world trade between a flexible wage America
and a minimum wage Europe. In doing so, we build on the classic work of Brecher (1974z
1974b). FromKrugman(1995) we appropriate the America vs. Europe dichotomy. The present
work has two distinctive fatures. The first is the explicit focus on factor markets in both
countries, and particularly on their interaction. The second is the examination of a broader range
of shocks to the trading economy than have been considered in earlier work.
1Another source of common shocks -- those due to global technological change --is
analyzed in Davis (1996a).3
This paper wnfirms that national factor market institutions matter. They profoundly affect
global patterns of output, employment, and wages. Surprisingly, thou~ in our context they have
no power in aaunting for cross-county differences in the evolution of relative wages. Often
forgotten in this mntext is that even countries with distinctive factor market institutions are linked
by world commodity prices and producers’ zero profit conditions. Hence an account of the
observed wage trends must move beyond an appeal to local institutional differences. A number of
potential accounts are mnsidered in this paper, as well as in Davis (1996~b).
We highlight here some of the more surprising results of the analysis. In a world in which
America and Europe have identical endowments, a move from autarky to free trade doubles the
European unemployment rate while raising American wages to the European level. In effect,
Europe bears the unemployment cost of high wages for both itself and America. In addition,
Europe’s commitment to maintaining high wages effectively insulates America horn external
disturbances. Europe, thou~ is not insulated from shocks in America. For example, a rise in
America’s labor endowment (e.g. from immigration), which raises American national income,
lowers European national income dollar for dollar. It also raises European unemployment one for
one.
We also examine the impact of the appearance of newly-industrializing countries (NICs)
on the global stage. We find that the European commitment to maintain a high wage wholly
insulates America from this shock. In Europe, there is an incipient rise in unemployment. In effect
this implies American wages are set in Berlin, not Beijing.* Only if Europe responds with implicit
or explicit trade barriers to the NICS is America timed. In this case, the negative employment
2 See Freeman’s (1995) paper “Are Your Wages Set in Beijing?’4
effits in Europe are mitigated, America sees increased trade with the NICS, and the relative wage
of the unskilled in America falls.
When we mnsider strategic interaction in the choice of factor market institutions, it is
possible that two wuntries which in autarky prefer to maintain a minimum wage will abandon this
for a flexible wage under free trade. This muld be interpreted m what is sometimes called the
“r= to the bottom” in labor standards.3 However, this is not a necessary, or perhaps even the
most likely outcome. As suggested above, conventional wisdom holds that America is closer to a
flexible wage economy, while Europe is closer to a minimum wage economy. This is another
equilibrium of the game we examine, and gives rise to what we term the Reagan-Mitterrand
paradox. In this case, unskilled workers are perversely worse off in the country nominally most
committed to protecting their interests. Reagan’s America and Mitterrand’s Europe shrue a
mrnmon wage. But Europe’s workers bear all the unemployment that sustains this wage,
This paper has six parts. Section ~ examines the consequences of differing labor market
institutions for countries linked by world commodity trade in homogeneous goods. Section III
examines the contrasting impacts on the stylized America and Europe posed by the appearance of
newly-industridizing wuntnes. Section IV examines the eff~s of factor accumulation in our two
countries on wages and unemployment. Section V considers the strategic choice of factor market
institutions, given our previous results, The final section concludes.
3 See, for example, the essay by Ralph Nader (1993).II. National Factor Markets and Global Trade
A, Unemployment in the Global Equilibrium
Our aim is to develop a model of trade between two countries, one of which has flexible
wages, while the other imposes a binding minimum wage on unskilled labor. It is wnvenient to
develop this in three stages. The tist considers a conventional two sector general equilibrium
model of a closed economy and establishes some relations that are key to later analysis. The
second introduces a binding minimum wage within the closed economy. Finally, we show the
isomorphism between this economy and the two-country trading world of interest.
Consider a closed flexible wage anomy. There are two factors of productio~ skill and
labor, available in fixed supply given by ~ and LW.These are used to produce two goods.
Assume that at any common factor prices, good X is skill intensive relative to the numeraire good,
Y.Assume that preferences are homothetic, and that both goods are necessaty in consumption.
Let w be the return to unskilled labor, and r the return to skilled labor. Then the competitive cost
conditions insure that for each sector price equals unit cost:
Cx(w, r) = P Cr(w, r) = 1
Assume that marginal products are always strictly positive. Then flexible wages insure fill
employment. Factor market clearing requires that employment in the two sectors equal the world
endowment:
Hx+Hy=~ LX+ LY=LW
By Walras’ law, goods market clearing is insured by equality of demand and supply of good X.
Three relations are key to our analysis. The first is a relation between the price P in a
closed economy and the endowment ratio, h =Hz, of that economy. The Heckscher-Ohlin6
theorem insures that a rise in skill abundance reduces the relative price of the skill intensive good,
This relation can be expressed as:
P = k(h), where k’(h) <O.
The second is the Stolper-Samuelson relation between goods prices and factor prices.
Given our assumption that X is always the skill-intensive sector, this defines a monotonic relatio~
of which we focus on ordy a part. bt w be the wage of labor in terms of the numeraire. Then by
Stolper-Samuelson:
w = ~), where #‘~) C O.
Thus given the endowment ratio of our closed economy, hw, we can determine directly the
equilibrium goods priu in the flexible wage case, P = lfiw’. Likewise, we can derive the
resulting flexible wage, # = ~) = ~l@W)), as well as the associated skilled wage. These
suffice to establish the basic characteristics of the world equilibrium.
We now introduce within the closed economy a binding minimum wage for the unskilled
at rate w* > ~. This will be consistent with an equilibrium featuring diversified production if and
ordy if the relative goods price is P l = @-‘ (w’) < ~. However these will be the equilibrium
goods and factor prices if and ody if empioyed factors are in the ratio h* = J -‘ ( #‘] (w”)) > hw.
The flexible rental for skill insures that it will always be filly employed. However with a binding
minimum wage, this need not be true for labor, Thus the manner in which relative employed
factors rise to h* is for the denominator to fdl via unemployed unstiled labor. With w* give~ h*
is determined, and ~ and Lw are the fixed world endowments. Let N be the level of labor actually
employed. Then simple algebra shows that unemployment in this economy, U = LW - N, is given
by our third key relation (E3recher):7
U* =Lw -fl/h* ~~”;fl, L?, where, ~ ‘@*) >0
These three key relations
characterizing the minimum wage
P
economy can be considered in Figure 1. s-s
/+1
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The Heckscher-OMn relatio~ P = A(h),
appears in quadrant one. The Stolper- W
Sarnuelson relatio~ w = ~), appears in
quadrant two. Finally, the link between
endowments, the employment ratio and
the level of unemployment is depicted in
u Brecher
quadrant four. In the flexible wage case, Figure 1 Determination of Equilibrium
the employment ratio equals the endowment ratio hw. This determines wages, priws and
unemployment as ~, ~, and zero respectively. In the minimum wage case, the path of
determination is different. The given minimum wage w* > # directly determines the goods price,
the employment ratio, and the unemployment level, as P*, h*, and U* respectively.
The basic link between the minimum wage and the appearance of unemployment in this
economy is ve~ simple. For competitive firms to pay the high wage w*, this must be supported by
an appropriate goods price P*. When the minimum wage binds, the appropriate goods price will
be attained ody if the relative scarcity of the labor intensive good rises relative to the flexible
wage equilibrium. And this will omur ody if a sufficient amount of labor is unemployed.
We now establish an isomorphism between the closed economy with a minimum wage and
a trading world in which one economy imposes a minimum wage while the other maintains a8
flexible wage. This relies on a mnupt introduced by Dixit and Norman (1980) known as the
integrated equilibrium. This establishes conditions under which trade in goods alone suffices to
establish the same world equilibrium as occurs in the closed economy with both goods and factor
mobility.
Consider, them a world of two countries with free trade and zero transport costs. One
country -- America -- has flexible wages. The other country -- Europe -- has imposed a minimum
wage at the level w*. The technologies and preferences in the two countries are identical to those
in the closed mnomy. The technologies are constant returns to scale, while the preferences are
identical and homothetic. Let a bar over a variable represent the level of that variable in the
integrated equilibrium. Let i index goods and j index countries. We can then describe the set of
divisions of world endowments among the two countries consistent with replicating the integrated
equilibrium. This is died the FPE set, and is described as:
FPE =
(HAm,LAm) = ~ ai,~m(~(i), ~(i)) i =X, Y
i
These conditions are very intuitive. If the integrated equilibrium is to be replicated, then world
unemployment must be at the same level as in the integrated economy, But unemployment cannot
arise in the flexible wage America. Hence Europe must endure the entire integrated equilibrium
level of unemployment, U*, to maintain the wage w*. Beyond this, we need only satis~ the
conventional restrictions in terms of employed factors. These require that both countries use the9
integrated equilibrium techniques, that the integrated equilibrium output in both sectors be divided
among the countries, and that this exactly exhaust employed factors in the two countries.4 The
FPE set is depicted as the bold parallelogram in Figure 2.
This allows us to state a key result: Under the conditions stated above, international trade
equalizes factor prices between the flexible wage and the minimum wage economies. The proof is
simply that under free and costless trade, competitive producers in the two countries face the
same goods prius, have the same technologies, and are (at least weakly) diversified. The equality
of factor prius then follows directly from the common competitive cost conditions.
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Figure 2 Equilibrium with Unemployment
and Factor Pnw Equalization
4 Since preferences are assumed to be identical and homothetic, the level of spending by
the unemployed does not matter for the pattern of world spending. Implicitly, thou~ we are
assuming that any spending by the unemployed is financed via lump sum transfers. The possibility
that the finance of the social safety net may itself fiect the level of unemployment is considered
fi.u-therin Davis (1996b).10
This is an important result. Even in the face of sharply divergent factor market institutions,
free commodity trade in a global market filly equalized factor prices. As we will consider more
fi~y below, this will sharply restrict the nature of shocks that can be appealed to in explaining
divergent wage trends between Europe and America.
B. Trade and Unemployment
We have shown how to construct a model of a trading world between a flexible wage
economy and one with a minimum wage. But we have not yet examined what impact trade has on
these economies relative to autm~. It is convenient to start with a highly stylized example that
establishes a benchmark. Further insight into the workings of this model will be provided by the
many comparative statics in later sections.
Take as a benchmark a world in which Europe and America are alike in every respect --
endowments, technologies, and preferences. The one exception is that America has a flexible
wage, while Europe has a minimum wage at level w*, assumed to bind in autarky. As before,
technologies are constant returns to scale. For simplicity, assume that preferences of the
representative consumer are homothetic.
Figure 3 depicts the salient aspects of the equilibriums The t~hnological production
frontier, CC; is common to America and Europe. In Europe, to support the wage w*, the
equilibrium price must be P*. The apposition of demand at P* is given by a(P*). Thus under
fi.dlemployment, production at prius P* in Europe would be at A, and demand at A ‘.This implies
an incipient excess demand for X, tending to raise P and lower w below w*. The incipient fdl in
5This builds on a diagram of Brecher (1974a). See also Krugman (1995).11
the wage is instead stanched via a decline in unskilled employment in Europe. With goods prices
fixed at P*, this is just the Rybczynski theorem in reverse, shifiing output along a minimum wage-
constrained PPF indicated by AB. Autar@ equilibrium in Europe is at E, at which the constrained
supply exactly matches the demand at prices P *. The shift of production in Europe from A to E
reflects the contraction of employment just necessary to eliminate the excess demand indicated by
W <By contrast, in Ameri~ the autarky equilibrium features a price P > P* and so an unskilled
wage w < w* (not depicted). There is no unemployment in America.
BC
Figure 3 Trade Doubles European Unemployment
Now consider the equilibrium when America and Europe trade freely. In order to support
the minimum wage wl , Europe still needs to maintain the price P* in equilibrium. At prices P*,
the American net trade offer is indicated by M‘. Thus world equilibrium at these prices requires
that Europe be willing to make this trade at prices P*, This requires that European production be
at point F, and absorption at F‘. As demand is homothetic, and production linear at all points12
along ~, the loss of employment in moving from E to F matches the pre-etisting unemployment
indexed by AE.4
This implies a striking contrast between Europe and America in the labor market.
Europe’s commitment to a high wage gave rise to unemployment in autarky. In our styked
example the opening of Europe to trade with America &ub/es European unemployment, as it is
forced to absorb the fill integrated equilibrium level of unemployment to sustain W*for both. In
AmericA the absence of unemployment in autarky came at the cost to workers of a lower real
wage. However once trade commenced, American workers came to share the high European
wage even as they suffered none of the unemployment that sustains that wage. The fact that they
suffer no unemployment is a consequence of the flexible wage in America. The fact that they
nonetheless share the European high wage under trade follows from the fact that trade links
goods prices, that both countries remain diversified, and that producers still must meet price
equals unit cost conditions. In effect, trade has forced European workers to bear the burden of
high unemployment to maintain not only their own high wage, but that in America as well.
How robust is this result? This is most easily illustrated by placing the same information in
a framework of export supply and import demand. A we have see~ the minimum wage
constraint makes European export supply at price P* multi-valued, comesponding to various
levels of unemployment. Graphically, this implies that the constrained export supply curve has a
horizontal segment that corresponds to the Rybczynski segment of the constrained PPF. In Figure
6An alternative way of seeing this is to note that ~(h*; Hw, Lw ) is linear homogeneous in
Hw and Lw for a tied h*, and that opening to America is the same as doubling the world
endowments (since Europe absorbs all of the unemployment).13
4 we depict this along with the American import demand cume for the case in which the countries
are otherwise identical.
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Figure 4 European Unemployment Props up
American Wages
We now mnsider perturbations in the position of the American import demand curve, and
consider their implications for unemployment and wages. So long as the American import demand
curve cuts the export supply curve of Europe between A and B, the equilibrium price will be P *,
so the wage will be w*. In all such cases, were Europe to abandon the minimum wage policy, both
European and American wages would fdl in the free trade equilibrium. The eff~ of trade with
America on European unemployment depends on whether the American import demand curve
cuts the European export supply curve in the region TBJET, or AE. If the equilibrium is in the
region ~, then European unemployment will more than double, reaching its maximum at B. If in
the region ET, European unemployment will be higher than in autarky, although at less than the
double rate. K, instead, the equilibrium is in the region AE, then trade with America actually14
lowers European unemployment. It continues to be true in all three cases, thou~ that under free
trade high American wages depend on the European minimum wage policy fi.Illyas much as
European wages do.
III. Shocks From the South: Implications for Europe and America
The impact of growing trade with developing countries on labor markets in developed
countries has been a source of great concern. It was at the heart of the vigorous opposition of the
AFL-CIO to the North American Free Trade Agreement, and has figured prominently in the
presidential campaigns of Ross Perot and Patrick Buchanan. Correlate concerns have been raised
over rapid integration of Eastern Europe into the markets of the European Union.
The evidence for the growing trade, particularly in manufactures, is indisputable. In the
period 1970-1990, the LDC share in manufactured imports of the United States and Europe more
than doubled -- rising to more than a third for the United States ~reeman (1995)].
Correspondingly, the share of manufactures in total non-fiel exports from LDCS rose from less
than one-fourth in 1970 to nearly three-fourths by 1989 wood (1994)].
However, what role -- if any -- this played in the factor market developments in Europe
and America is still in wntest. Wood (1994) has been the strongest proponent of the view that
trade with the LDCS has mattered. Qualified support for this view has come from Learner (1995).
By contrmt, Krugman and Lawrence (1993) have argued forcefully that the volume of trade is
insufficient to account for relative wage movements in the United States. Similarly, Modi~lani
(1995, p. 7) insists that the argument that increased trade with developing countries raised
unemployment in Europe is “nonsense, reflecting economic illiteracy.”15
Krugman (1995) examined the impact of a trade shock on a minimum wage Europe and a
flexible wage Americ~ concluding that it would raise unemployment in the former and reduce
wages in the latter. However his study, on a theoretical plane, belongs to the category earlier
identfied as “comparative.” That is, he examines this one country at a time. As we will see, the
results change importantly when we turn to a global approach in which Europe and America exist
within the same world mnomy.’
We begin again with a flexible wage Americ~ and a minimum wage Europe. For
simplicity, and without loss of generality, we shifi our base case to consider that in which P* is
the American autarky price. This is also the European autarky price with the minimum wage in
place. And so when free trade is allowed between America and Europe, P* is the equilibrium
price. Europe has the same level of unemployment as in autarky, and both have the same wages in
autarky as under free trade,
We now consider the introduction of a previously isolated regio~ which we will call the
MCS, to the American and European free trade system. Asume that at prices P*, the NICS are
importers of the good X. Our mncem will be to trace through the implications of this for Europe
and America. In our diagrq this can be represented as a nghtward shifi of the joint Arnerican-
NIC import demand curve. However, given Europe’s commitment to its minimum wage, the
world price P* does not change (Figure 5).
7This comparative theoretical approach is at work as well in an argument by the Center
for Economic Policy Research (1995, p, 53). They argue that evidence, as in Lawrence and
Slaughter (1993), exculpating Stolper-Samuelson in Arneric~ likewise refites claims that trade
with the NICS may have raised unemployment in Europe. However, as the discussion here makes
clear, one r-n that increased trade with the NICS may not account for falling wages in America
is precisely that it As raise unemployment in Europe.16
At an unchanged world price, the American import demand is unchanged. So the US
absorbs none of the imports from the NICS. American wages continue to be protected by the
European mmrn.itment to a high wage policy, In Europe, by mntrast, there will be a surge of
imports from the NICS.E The impact of this is similar to that analyzed above. Given the European
commitment to a high wage policy, this will not show up in reduced wages, but rather in higher
unemployment.
P
Figure 5 Entry of the NICS to the Global Economy
This integrated global ~onomy presents an important contrast with the results of
Krugman (1995). There he treated the American and European cases as though they were part of
different global economies. However, as we see here, the links via goods trade are crucial for
8The actual pattern of trade -- whether MCS deliveries are to America or Europe -- is
inconsequential. The important point is that the price P* defines the world net offer to Europe.
Europe must absorb this net offer to maintain the price P*, and so accept the employment
consequences.17
understanding the broader story. So long as Europe maintains a commitment to both free trade
and a high wage policy, Arnenw is filly insulated from the NIC shock.
As this suggests, the appearance of the ~Cs might severely strain Europe’s commitment
to both a high wage policy and free trade. We will wnsider here the mnsequences for Europe and
America of European restrictions on imports. We will analyze this for the case of a tariff, although
alternative policies would have similar implications.
Asume, them that Europe imposes a tariff on imports of Y,while maintaining its
mmmitment to the wage w*. The latter commitment is equivalent to maintaining its domestic
price at P*. Hence so long as European imports are wealdy positive the world relative price of Y
must fd below P* by exactly the amount of the tariff. The tariff has two effects in Europe. It
raises revenue proportional to the remaining imports, and it attenuates the negative employment
eff’s of the NIC shock. With the higher relative price of X resulting from Europe’s trade
restrictions, America experiences a surge of trade with the NICS. Moreover, the free trade,
flexible wage America finds that the resulting higher price of X has served to depress wages a la
Stolper-Samuelson. Of course America suffers no unemployment.
In sum the appearance of the NICS gives rise to a trade shock. America is fully insulated
from this shock as a result of Europe’s commitment to a high wage policy. Europe, by contrast,
finds the rests of this policy escalating sharply as it is forced to endure ever higher levels of
unemployment to sustain the high wages. Its commitment to maintaining both free trade and high
wages is under assault. If it responds by implicitly or explicitly rsising barriers to the NICS’
exportable (Y), then trade with the NICS is shunted toward America and the world price of the
labor intensive good falls. By Stolper-Samuelson this pulls the American wage down.18
IV. Global Labor Supplies, European Unemployment
A. Discussion
Leading labor economists have identified cross-count~ differences in the evolution of the
labor force as an important explanatory factor in the divergent evolution of wages between
mntinental Europe and the United States and United Kingdom. The underlying theoretical
framework for these studies makes the acknowledged “stark” assumption of a steady trend in the
growth of the SW intensity of labor demand. Under this assumptio~ a decline in the growth rate
of the skill intensity of the labor force will induce a rise in the relative wages of the skilled. If the
degree of substitutability between skilled and unskilled is sufficiently low, then these supply
changes could account for all -- even more than all -- of the obsewed rise in the skill premium in
the United States. In any case, the story matches reasonably well the experience of the United
States, Brit@ Japan and France Katz and Murphy (1992), Ka~ et. al. (1995)].
As insightful as this line of research hm bee~ it would be more satis~ng to consider this
in a theoretical framework in which the cross-country structure of labor demand is endogenous. It
might seem obvious that cross-wuntry differences in the levels and growth rates of relative factor
supplies should help to explain differences in relative wages. However, this need not be true when
countries are linked by commodity trade. In fact, the absence of such a relation is the central
message of SamuelSon’s Factor Price Equalization theorem (1949). Under the conditions in which
that theorem is valid, the structure of relative wages depends on the evolution of the global labor
force.9 However cross country differences in the imposition or growth rates of the labor force
9In fact, this extends to a more general setting. It is straightfomard to write down a
model in which orIIya subset of the world enjoys ftior price equalization ~avis, Weinste~ et.al.19
will contribute nothing to an understanding of divergent wage trends, Given that we have seen
that our model with unemployment likewise yields factor price equalizatio~ we w likewise
conclude that differential labor for~ growth will not help to account for divergent wage
pattems,l”
Although changes in relative factor supplies will not play a role in amounting for cross-
country dtierences in relative wages, they will be essential for understanding the evolution of
unemployment in Europe. There will be a correlate to the Factor Price Equalization theorem: The
level of European unemployment depends on global -- not local -- factor supphes. One
consequence of this is that dramatic changes in American factor accumulation -- the shifts due to
baby booms and busts -- may leave their most profound mark not on American but European
labor markets. By contrast, the unemployment rate in Europe will depend importantly on where
factor accumulation occurs, The conditions under which European unemployment falls are less
stringent when factor accumulation is in Europe than in America.
The model also features an important asymmetry. The fixed European minimum wage
insulates America from all shocks caused by factor accumulation in Europe. But the reverse is not
true. Factor accumulation in America has very profound effects on Europe.
(1996)]. Subject to the general restrictions underlying FPE [see Dixit and Norman (1980)], the
site of endowment changes among those sharing FPE matters neither for comparative nor
absolute wages.
10It is tempting at this juncture to dismiss the factor price equalization framework by
noting that in f~ there tie been divergent wage trends. This would suggest investigating
alternative frameworks in which local relative factor supplies do matter for local relative wages.
This is a promising direction of research but not that pursued here. &we saw in Section III, one
path towards accounting for the divergent trends is to introduce differential trade policies. Davis
(1996~b) considers alternative accounts, including differential patterns of local technological
change and cross-muntry differences in the evolution of public finance.20
One striking example concerns the immigration of unskilled labor to America. Consider
the case of the Marie] boatlift, which raised the labor force in Miami by seven per cent. Card
(1990) has demonstrated that this had no appreciable impact on wages or unemployment in
Miami. This is just as our model would predict. However, the model suggests that the drastic
eff-s should have been found not in Miami, but Madrid and Marseilles. In fact, the model
predicts that Euro- national inwme will fall dollar-for-dollar with the rise in American national
income, while European unemployment rises one-for-one with the incremental employment of the
M~ielifm.ll Having committed itself to the fixed wage, Europe must brave the potentially harsh
winds of external shocks.
In the mnventional Heckscher-Ohlin framework the central theorem dealing with
endowment changes is that of Rybczynsti. It says that at fixed goods prices, an increase in the
endowment of a factor leads to a more than proportional increase in output in the sector that uses
that ftior intensively, and a contraction in the other sector. At the initial equilibrium price this
would be exp~ed to create an excess supply of the good that uses that factor intensively,
lowering its equilibrium relative price, and by Stolper-Samuelson reducing the return to that
factor. In the wnventional setting, at fixed prices, changes in the endowment of one country have
no effect on output supplies in the other.
11The story will be exactly true if Cuba is thought of u beiig fi~y isolated from world
markets and if the emigrants are homogeneous with American unskilled labor. A qualitatively
similar, though more nuand, story emerges if migration is endogenous, but comes from a
country integrated into the global trading system. I plan to examine this in fiture work.21
B. Derivation of Principal Results
We now turn to a systematic evaluation of the impact of factor accumulation in our
present model. We begin by wnsidering the implications for the global ewnomy, and ther~turn to
examine how these eff~s are distributed according to where the accumulation takes place. We
continue to assume throughout that Europe maintains the minimum wage at W*and that both
economies are diversified.
Several observations will make the derivation of the results more transparent. Europe’s
commitment to maintain the high wage w* is likewise a commitment to maintain a domestic
relative price P’, as given by the zero profit conditions for the two goods. With free trade, this
will also be the world relative price. We saw above that the common goods prices yield factor
price equalization. Cost-minimizing firms with identical technologies will then pick the same
factor intensities in both countries, denoted hx and hy With P* fixed in all equilibria that we
consider, these factor intensities will also be fixed. Because of identical and homothetic demand,
P* also fixes the ratio in which X and Ywill be consumed. This implies directly that world output
at equilibrium must be supplied in the same proportion. This absorbs factors in a certain
proportio~ denoted by h*, This represents both the minimum skill-intensity that the world
mnomy needs to yield the wage w l in a flexible wage world, and the actual skill-abundace of
total employed factors in the world with at least one economy with a minimum wage at w*.
Unemployment will arise when the actual world endowment, hw, is such that hw < h*. The
Rybczynski Theorem is usually stated for a fixed exogenous price. Here we consider the case in
which the price is held 6xed by the commitment of Europe to maintain the minimum wage.
Finally, recall that unemployment can be written as U* = Lw - ~/h*.22
Although our principal interest is in the effects of factor accumulatio~ it is convenient to
begin with aversion of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem for trade between a flexible wage economy
and a minimum wage economy. ht M denote the skill to labor ratio in flexible wage America.
Given a minimum wage w* that binds where applied, and that both mnomies are diversified, the
world employment ratio of skill to labor is fixed at h*. The flexible wage America will be an
exporter of the skill intensive good if and only if W > h*. The minimum wage Europe will have a
complementary trade pattem.The easiest way to see how the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem works
here is simply to delete Europe’s unemployed from Figure 2. They do not contribute income, so
consume ordy from transfers that they will spend in the same pattern as those employed. Having
done this, our diagram just bmmes the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin model, although now in
terms of emplopd factors.
We now turn to the results mncerning accumulation of factors. A rise in the world
endowment of skill expands the output of both goods proportionally. Employment rises to
maintain the ratio of employed factors at h*. If the skill accumulation occurs in flexible wage
Ameriq it will have conventional Rybczynski effects, raising the output of X more than
proportionally and decreasing the local output of Y[see Figure 6]. However this also tiects
Europe, which has a rise in employment at rate UU’ = N = & /h*. It has Rybczynski effects
skewed the other directio~ with output of Y rising more than proportionally, and output of X
declining. The net impact of the output changes in the two countries must, as noted, raise output
of X and Yin proportion to the initial world output.23
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Figure 6 Skill Accumulation in Flexible Wage America
If instead the skill accumulation occurs in minimum wage Europe, we have a very different
picture. In Europe we ftil to have conventional Rybczynski effects. Incipient excess supply of X
threatens to raise the wage above w* at the initial level of employment. This allows employment
to rise by N = ti / hl . That is, total employment of factors in Europe has risen in exact
proportion to total initial employment in the world as a whole, h*. Thus, output in Europe
expands propofiional to initial world output. America is entirely unaffected, as its net trade vector
is fifly determined by the constant price ratio P*.
Now mnsider the effect of accumulation of unskilled labor. At the global level,
unemployment rises by the fill increment to the labor force. There is no effect on global output. If
the accumulation occurs in minimum wage Europe, unemployment rises directly with no effect on24
output in either country. However, if accumulation of unskilled labor happens in Arneric~ there
are very dramatic sh.ifis [see Figure 7]. America continues to have conventional Rybczynski
efftis, raising the output of Ymore than proportionally, and reducing the output of X. Income in
America rises linearly, so & = w* ALA.Europe is also strongly tiected. In fact, European
unemployment rises one for one with accumulation of unskilled labor in America, And European
inwme fds dollar for dollar with the rise in American income. Its shifi in output exactly offsets
that of Americ~ so that global output is unchanged.
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Figure 7 Unskilled Labor Accumulation in America25
V. The Reagan-Mitterrand Paradox
So fw we have treated the policy choice of flexible wages versus a minimum wage as
determined exogenously. Yet these institutions have changed over time. One of the most
noteworthy aspects of this change has been the sharp decline in private sector union membership
in the United States in recent decades. The constellation of forces that led to declining strength of
labor in the US and a continuing strength in Europe are numerous. In this section we consider a
highly stylized version of this social choice problem. We imagine that the choice of factor market
institutions is the work of a single decisionmaker representing each “country” -- Reagan in
Americ~ and Mtterrand in Europe.
The choice each must face is whether to impose a minimum wage at w* or to maintain a
filly flexible wage, Under this assumptio~ and given the symmetry of underlying economic
conditions, there are four types of payoffs that sewe as arguments to their social welftie finction:
F: Define F to be the symmetric payoff when both choose a flexible wage policy.
M: Define A4to be the symmetric payoff when both choose to impose the same binding
minimum wage. We take as the central case that in which this results in an even division of the
resulting unemployment. 12
T: This is the payoff when a country that has flexible wages while the counterpart has a
minimum wage. “T’ reflects the fact that this country comes out on top in the bargai~ enjoying
the higher wage without having to suffer unemployment.
‘2This is the division that one would anticipate if all other aspects of symmetry were
preserved but European and American goods were imperf’t substitutes. One can consider our
case as the limit of a sequence of anomies in which the substitutability of European and
American goods rises toward tinity.26
B: This is the payoff to a country when it has a minimum wage while the counterpart has a
flexible wage. “B’ reflects the fti that this count~ comes out on bottom in the bargai~ enjoying
the higher wage but bearing the burden of high unemployment for both countries.
CHART ONE
Reagan
Mitterand ~ur, ~)
Flexible Wages Minimum Wage
Flexible Wages (F,F) (T, B)
Minimum Wage (B,T) MM
We begin with a few general observations. First, both Reagan and Mitterrand must always rank
* it always prefers that the other country T ~M. That is, if a country can maintain the wage w ,
bear the burden of unemployment that supports it. Thus, even if each in autarky would choose to
impose the minimum wage, this game will never support a trade equilibrium in which both
maintain the minimum wage. As well, it will always be the case that M >B. That is, one would
always prefer to share the unemployment burden of maintaining the wage w* rather than have to
bear it alone. It will also be true that T > F. This is equivalent to the observation that America
enjoyed (conventional) gains from trade in our general equilibrium above, and that on top of this
w = w* for the wuntry with outcome T. Thus for both muntries in all cases, T >F, and T >M >
B. The games thus diffw only in two dimensions: wherein this ordering below T that F goes for
each and whether the rankings by Reagan and Mitterrand are the same. In the following we will
restrict our attention to pure strategy equilibria on the grounds that major institutional features of
the labor market cannot be changed from day to day, or perhaps even born year to year.27
We now consider the equilibria resulting from the game between Reagan and Mitterrand.
Chart Two empfiis two points. The first concerns the type of equilibria that emerge. Here
there are ody two basic types. In one of the~ both America and Europe allow a flexible wage. In
the other type of equilibriu~ one country bears the entire burden of unemployment for sustaining
the high wage. Notice that both countries imposing a minimum wage is not an equilibrium. The
-nd point from Chart Two is that the type of equilibrium is determined by the countries’
relative rardcings of the flexible outcome, F, and the outcome of bearing alone the cost of
supporting the minimum wage, B.
CHART TWO
Reagan
F> B ~, F) ! (T, B)
m
I ~, T) I (B, T) or (T, B)
We will consider the characterization that America has flexible wages relative to those in
Europe a a suggestion that Reagan ranks the equilibrium in which both have flexible wages as
preferable to one in which America ends up on bottom. In this case, flexible wages area dominant
strategy for Reagan. However, we may leave open the question of whether Mitterrand rds F ~
B or the reverse. If Mitterrand does rh F > B, then the equilibrium will feature flexible wages in
both auntries. This includes the case in which both rti M ~ F > B. This wou[d be a case in
which each would impose the minimum wage in autarky, but both turn to flexible wages under
trade. In common terms this maybe viewed m a “race to the bottom.”28
However, a race to the bottom is not a necessary outcome. Nor may it be the most likely
outcome. Our earlier discussion suggested that Mitterrand may have a stronger wrnmitment to
maintaining the minimum wage. Thus Reagan ranks F >B, and Mitterrand the reverse. h this
case, the equilibrium f-tures a flexible wage in America and a minimum wage in Europe. Where
do the unskilled end up better o~ This is precisely the case analyzed earlier. They end up better
off in Reagan’s America than in Mitterrand’s Europe. The reason is that they both enjoy the same
high wage, but European workers must endure the unemployment that sustains it.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has one overarching message. Even when factor markets are strictly local, with
idiosyncratic institutional features, they cannot be considered in isolation when goods markets are
global. This strongly suggests the importance of a unified “global” approach to explaining recent
factor market developments in Europe and America, This will be an important complement to
existing studies, which are either of individual countries or comparative.
A striking example of the importance of the global perspective emerges in the contrasting
effects of trade on a flexible-wage America and a minimum-wage Europe. In our central example,
trade doubles the European unemployment rate while leading American wages to converge to the
high European level.
Moreover, commodity trade leads local institutional f~tures to have important spillover
effects on other countries. These go fm beyond the simple general equilibrium fact that they will
tiect the level of wages and the composition of production. They may findarnentally alter the
nature of a country’s relation with the international environment. For example, if Europe and29
America are both flexible wage economies, then the entry of the NICS to world markets may
depress wages in each. However, we saw that when Europe imposed a minimum wage, it
absorbed the fi.dlimpact of the NIC shock and wholly insulated America from its effects. That is,
a lmd European institutional f=ture has sharply altered America’s relation to the trading world.
The local institutional f~tures may likewise introduce important asymmetries in the
relations between the countries. As noted, America is wholly insulated from external shocks,
including factor supply shocks in Europe. By contrast, factor supply shocks in America have very
powefil effis in Europe. A striking example owurs with a rise in the unskilled labor force in
America. This raises American income, yet lowers European income dollar for dollar, while
raising European unemployment one for one.
The importance of considering the links via commodity trade is particularly important
when thinking about the evolution of wages. In spite of important differences in factor market
institutions, which in a closed economy would induce differences in factor prices, goods trade
here insures fill factor price equalization. Perversely, labor ends up worst off in the country
nominally most supportive of its aspirations.
These powerfi.d effects of trade suggest that muntnes must consider international markets
when designing local labor market institutions. When we allow for a strategic choice of labor
market institutions, we see that it is possible that two countries may resofi to a low flexible wage
under trade even if in autarky they support a minimum wage, In common terms, this maybe
viewed as a “ram to the bottom.” However this is not a neces~ result of integration of global
goods markets. Nor, perhaps, does it seem to be the one most in accord with stylized accounts of
American and European experience. This account, which emphasizes the relatively strong30
European commitment to labor, may actually signal that American labor has received a free ride --
high wages supported by unemployment in Europe.
This paper has derived these results in a stylized model. Care should be taken in reading
these results too rdily into actual historical experience. Nonetheless the issue that it raises of the
powefil interaction between local factor market institutions and global goods markets are no
doubt very important. And the results are sufficiently provocative to warrant closer examination.References
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